统计研究 ›› 2023, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (11): 53-67.doi: 10.19343/j.cnki.11–1302/c.2023.11.005

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宏观审慎、货币政策与银行贷款竞争的风险效应

顾海峰 于家珺   

  • 出版日期:2023-11-25 发布日期:2023-11-25

Macro-prudential Regulation, Monetary Policies and the Risk Effect of Bank Loan Competition

Gu Haifeng Yu Jiajun   

  • Online:2023-11-25 Published:2023-11-25

摘要: 本文在阐释银行贷款竞争风险效应生成机理的基础上,分析了宏观审慎与货币政策对这一效应的影响机制,并选取321家商业银行2007—2021年的面板数据进行实证分析。研究发现,贷款竞争与银行风险之间存在U型关系,且通过了Lind-Mehlum三步法检验;在竞争度低于临界值的良性竞争区制与高于临界值的恶性竞争区制,贷款竞争分别具有风险抑制与风险加剧效应。政策工具的边际影响方面,资本监管对贷款竞争的风险效应具有结构性治理优势,其在加强良性竞争风险抑制效应的同时减弱了恶性竞争的风险加剧效应;紧缩性货币政策与货币政策不确定性则面临权衡,二者分别从整体上削弱与放大了贷款竞争的风险效应。政策工具的协同影响方面,紧缩性货币政策及货币政策不确定性对资本监管的治理效果在良性竞争区制均无显著影响,在恶性竞争区制分别具有加强与削弱作用。进一步考察结构维度宏观审慎因素的影响发现,以同业负债占比刻画的银行直接关联有助于增强良性竞争的风险抑制效应,但也会放大恶性竞争的风险加剧效应;以业务同质化水平刻画的银行间接关联会削弱良性竞争的风险抑制效应,且会放大恶性竞争的风险加剧效应。本研究对于银行业市场化改革背景下协调运用宏观审慎及货币政策维护银行体系稳健运行具有重要的政策启示。

关键词: 宏观审慎, 货币政策, 银行贷款竞争, 风险效应

Abstract: This paper conducts an empirical test on the influencing mechanism of macro-prudential regulation and monetary policies on the risk effect of bank loan competition by selecting the panel data of 321 Chinese commercial banks from 2007 to 2021. The main findings are as follows. First, loan competition has a U-shaped effect on bank insolvency risk, which passes the Lind-Mehlum U test. When competition level is beneath the critical value, virtuous loan competition exerts a risk-curbing effect. When competition level is above the critical value, vicious loan competition exerts a risk-increasing effect. Second, in terms of marginal impact, capital regulation amplifies the risk-curbing effect of virtuous competition and mitigates the risk-increasing effect of vicious competition, showing a structural governance advantage on the risk effect of loan competition. Tightening monetary environment abates both effects, while monetary policy uncertainty amplifies both effects. Third, in terms of interactive impact, within the virtuous competition regime, tightening monetary environment and monetary policy uncertainty do not have a significant effect on the impact of capital regulation. Within the vicious competition regime, tightening monetary environment and monetary policy uncertainty respectively strengthen and weaken the impact of capital regulation. Forth, in terms of structural macro-prudential factors, direct interbank connection strengthens the risk-curbing effect of virtuous competition, but amplifies the risk-increasing effect of vicious competition. Indirect interbank connection weakens the risk-curbing effect of virtuous competition and amplifies the risk-increasing effect of vicious competition. Our research has important policy implications in terms of maintaining bank system soundness using the macro-prudential policy and monetary policies under the background of the market-based reform of the banking sector.

Key words: Macro-prudential Regulation, Monetary Policy, Bank Loan Competition, Risk Effect