关键词: 监管套利, 影子银行, 结构性货币政策, 宏观审慎政策

Abstract: Since the 2008 international financial crisis, the disorderly development of shadow banks has led to the increasingly serious problem of “departure from real to virtual” in the financial system, the obstruction of traditional credit channels and the structural imbalance of social financing. In this regard, the People’s Bank of China has strengthened the supervision of shadow banking and created a variety of structural monetary policy tools. While curbing the disorderly development of shadow banking, the People’s Bank of China has targeted support for the real economy to expand credit financing, to solve the problem of financial capital Being diverted out of the economy. This paper brings the structural monetary policy and shadow banking macro-prudential supervision into the “dual-pillar” regulation framework, and analyzes the policy effect and feasible policy matching of the “dual-pillar” policy framework. The study finds that the traditional credit regulation and aggregate monetary policy are likely to induce regulatory arbitrage, which is difficult to achieve precise regulation. In contrast, structural monetary policy can reduce the cost of bank credit funds, dredge credit channels and realize financial “reality”. The macro-prudential policy of shadow banks can limit the blind expansion of shadow banks and reduce the “virtuality” of finance. Further research shows that the two types of policies have a superposition effect, which can form a better policy synergy. In addition, effectively identifying the underlying asset risk of shadow banks can inhibit the countercyclical expansion of shadow banks through risk channels and achieve better policy effect in the stage of monetary policy tightening. This study provides new analytical ideas and conclusions for the “dual-pillar” policy boundary expansion and policy coordination.

Key words: Regulatory Arbitrage, Shadow Banking, Structural Monetary Policy, Macro-prudential Policy