关键词: 利率市场化, 企业金融化, 融资约束, 公司治理

Abstract: This paper re-examines the conclusion of the literature on liberalization of the lower bound for loan interest rates (LBLIR) inhibiting enterprises’ financialization theoretically and empirically, and verifies the robustness of the empirical results from multiple perspectives. The study finds that the deregulation of the LBLIR significantly promotes the financialization of non-state-owned enterprises, by alleviating enterprises’ financing constraints. The impact of deregulation of LBLIR on the financialization is more pronounced in enterprises with smaller size, higher profit pressure and lower industrial return, indicating the motivation of enterprises’ financialization is market arbitrage rather than precautionary savings. Furthermore, this paper investigates the governance mechanisms of enterprises’ financialization regarding macroeconomic environment, industry competition, and corporate governance. The results show that stable economic growth, moderately loose monetary policy, diversified financing channels, and effective internal governance structure help reduce the impact of deregulation of the LBLIR on enterprises’ financialization. However, product market competition encourages enterprises to ease the profit pressure through financialization. This paper helps to re-understand the impact of the deregulation of the LBLIR on enterprises’ financialization, and provides new evidence on the tratment of enterprises’ transforming from substantial to fictitious.

Key words: Interest Rate Liberalization, Enterprises’ Financialization, Financing Constraints, Corporate Governance