统计研究 ›› 2022, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (9): 74-87.doi: 10.19343/j.cnki.11–1302/c.2022.09.006

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融资约束、金融资产持有与银行贷款

杨 玲 朱宏泉   

  • 出版日期:2022-09-25 发布日期:2022-09-25

Financial Constraints, Financial Assets Holding and Bank Loans

Yang Ling Zhu Hongquan   

  • Online:2022-09-25 Published:2022-09-25

摘要: 巩固壮大实体经济根基,需要防范实体企业“脱实向虚”。本文基于非金融上市公司2003—2019年的面板数据,从金融资产分类的新视角,探讨并验证金融资产类别对企业金融中介活动的影响机理;通过引入融资约束度量指标,构建固定效应面板门槛模型,实证检验融资约束对企业金融中介活动的非线性影响。研究结果表明:第一,企业金融中介活动因金融资产的类别差异而存在异质性,在套利及贷款输送动机的作用下,企业固定收益类金融资产与银行贷款正相关,非固定收益类金融资产与银行贷款负相关;第二,企业金融中介活动由于融资约束程度不同而存在门槛效应;第三,对固定收益类金融资产而言,不同融资约束的企业均存在金融中介活动,低、高融资约束企业从事金融中介活动的程度弱,而中融资约束企业由于防御性动机的增强,金融中介活动程度强;第四,对非固定收益类金融资产而言,低、高融资约束企业不存在金融中介活动,而中融资约束企业出于防御动机而表现出金融中介活动。本研究可为根据融资约束程度对企业分级评估和监督贷款提供理论支撑,为厘清金融中介活动的机理、压缩市场套利空间提供有益参考。

关键词: 融资约束, 金融资产, 银行贷款, 门槛效应

Abstract: In order to consolidate and strengthen the foundation of the real economy, it is necessary to prevent real enterprises from engaging in financial intermediary activities and prevent “the real-to-fictitious economy”. Based on the panel data of non-financial listed firms from 2003 to 2019, this paper classifies financial assets into fixed-yield and non-fixed-yield according to their different expected interest, and verifies the impact mechanism of different categories of financial assets on firms’ financial intermediary behavior. This paper also introduces financial constraint indicator and builds a fixed-effect panel threshold model to examine the nonlinear impact of financial constraints on firms’ financial intermediary behavior. The results show that firms’ financial intermediary behavior is heterogeneous due to different categories of financial assets. Due to arbitrage and loan transmission motives, corporate fixed-yield financial assets are positively correlated with bank loans, and the non-fixed-yield financial assets are negatively correlated with bank loans. Financial constraints have a threshold effect on firms’ financial intermediary behavior. As to the fixed-yield financial assets, firms with different financial constraints all have financial intermediary behavior. Among them, firms with high and low financial constraints engage less in financial intermediary behavior, while firms with medium financial constraints engage more in financial intermediary behavior due to increased precautionary motives. As to non-fixed-yield financial assets, firms with high and low financial constraints have no financial intermediary behavior, but firms with medium financial constraints exhibit financial intermediary behavior because of precautionary motives. This study provides useful references to evaluate their customers and to supervise bank loans according to the different degrees of financial constraints of firms, and clarify the mechanism of financial intermediary behavior so as to reduce market arbitrage space.

Key words: Financial Constraints, Financial Assets, Bank Loans, Threshold Effect