关键词: 股权质押, 实控人, 异质特征, 道德风险

Abstract: The difficulty of measuring moral hazard is that we can’t directly observe the psychological activity and emotional value of the information dominant party, while the psychological activity and emotional value of economic actors are obviously heterogeneous. Based on the value function theory, this paper takes the actual controller’s equity pledge behavior of listed enterprises as the research object, and constructs the identification model of actual controller’s heterogeneous characteristics by introducing emotional value function into the value evaluation of actual controllers. On this basis, using the potential profile analysis and Bayesian hierarchical model, this paper proposes a measurement scheme for different types of actual controllers’ equity pledge moral hazard. Combined with the actual data of listed enterprises in China, this paper classifies the actual controllers of listed enterprises in China and measures their moral hazard of equity pledge with empirical analysis. The empirical results show that among the actual controllers of China’s private listed companies, although the proportion of “interest” type actual controllers is the smallest, their moral hazard value reaches a considerable degree. There is a big difference in moral hazard among heterogeneous real controllers. The high moral hazard groups mainly come from the real controllers of “interest” type private enterprises and non-private enterprises, while the “emotional” type controllers have the characteristic of low moral hazard evolution. The moral hazard of actual controllers in non-private enterprises is higher than that in private enterprises.

Key words: Equity Pledge, Actual Controller, Heterogeneous Characteristics, Moral Hazard