关键词: R&D补贴, 寻租, 全要素生产率, PSTR模型, 中介效应

Abstract: R&D subsidy may remedy the market dysfunction caused by externality on one aspect, is easy to induce the action of rent-seeking to reduce the efficiency of subsidy. There is no agreement reached on whether the R&D subsidy can promote the escalation of total factor productivity (TFP) or not. This paper constructs a two-stage dynamic game model to relate to a R&D subsidy mechanism from the perspective of interaction between the government and enterprises. It is found that when the intensity of R&D subsidy is higher than certain threshold, it might be easy to seduce the enterprise to emit a false signal in the option of innovation ploys, which reduces the efficiency of government R&D handouts. Furthermore, tests are done on the heterogeneous impacts of various intensities of R&D subsidy on TFP by means of Chinese provincial panel data, and probing for the route of rent-seeking effecting R&D subsidy and TFP. The empirical results show that R&D subsidy in general has a negative effect on TFP, the more the intensity of subsidy, the more the negative effect. The rent-seeking is an important channel for high level R&D subsidy to curb TFP escalation. Therefore, in the process of carrying out innovative policies, the subsidy levels to various innovative enterprises need to be adjusted from time to time to prevent the rent-seeking induced by long-term intensive subsidy. It is essential to ensure the enterprises to obtain what they really need and the TFP to escalate.

Key words: R&D Subsidy, Rent-seeking, Total Factor Productivity, RSTR Model, Mesomeric Effect