关键词: 地方债, 资源禀赋, 金融成熟度, 关系成本

Abstract: The expansion of the local government debt in China has raised serious doubts about the incentive and the solvency of the local officials. Through the empirical research from cities in China from 2004 to 2012, this paper indicates that the endowment of the city is an important element that affects the local officials’ incentive and ability to issue bonds, which we call “Market Rules”. Specially, the governments’ ability of debt issuing becomes lower when facing the more serious financial deficit. Meanwhile, the probability of debt issuing will increase if the governments’ impulsion to invest is stronger and the same is true of the cities with higher GDP and economy growth rate. Furthermore, we find that the “Market Rules” appears to be more significant in the cities with higher financial maturity degree. Contrarily, the existence of “relationship payment” has broken the constraints of “Market Rules” on local government. Our research enriches the understanding of local government debt.

Key words: Local Government Debt, Endowment, Financial Maturity Degree, Relationship Payment