关键词: 政治关系网络, 在职消费, 企业业绩, 制度环境

Abstract: Duty consumption can be one way for the senior executives’ embezzling of the corporate residual assets, which poses a difficult issue for the enterprise nowadays. This article, taking the sample data from a-share markets in both Shanghai and Shenzhen and from the point of view of political networks among those senior executives, has made an analysis on the effect of the duty consumption in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises towards the management of the enterprises. The research has found out that the political networks in the state-owned enterprises have enlarged the scale of duty consumption, however, on the other hand, the duty consumption has been notably suppressed by such network in non-state-owned enterprise. The marketization process can effectively lower down the control of the government over state-owned enterprises and reduce the appeal of the non-state-owned enterprises for the government enterprises relationship networks, so as to bring down the scale of duty consumption and to boost the enterprises’ profit. The article has also pointed out that on the premise of a imperfect legal system and weak protection of ownership in our country, it is of great significance to press down the scale of duty consumption and improve enterprises’ performance in solving the traditional agency issue, more importantly, to reduce the expensive transaction fees due to the lack of proper system and regulations. From a long term view, accelerating the process of marketization can effectively reduce the rent-seeking activities, bring down duty consumption and transaction costs, and further optimize the allocation of resources in the entire society.

Key words: Political Networks, Duty Consumption, Enterprises Performance, Institutional Environment