统计研究 ›› 2005, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (2): 35-3.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

存款保险、道德风险与银行最优监管——一个分析框架及其在中国的应用

吴军;邹恒甫   

  1. 武汉大学
  • 收稿日期:1900-01-01 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2005-02-15 发布日期:2005-02-15

  • Received:1900-01-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2005-02-15 Published:2005-02-15

Abstract: The relation between deposit insurance and moral hazard is the focus of constructing deposit insurance system.In this paper,a model is constructed from the view of bank for illustrating this relation and is applied in China. The conclusion of this paper is the degree of moral hazard doesn‘t depend on the type but depend on the parameter of deposit insurance system. When it comes to China, the transformation from implicit deposit insurance system to explicit deposit insurance system can efficiently improve monitoring level of bank, reduce the emergence of moral hazard.