统计研究 ›› 2003, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (10): 39-6.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

大股东侵害与上市公司资产评估偏差

周勤业;夏立军;李莫愁   

  1. 上海证券交易所 ;上海财经大学
  • 收稿日期:1900-01-01 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2003-10-15 发布日期:2003-10-15

  • Received:1900-01-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2003-10-15 Published:2003-10-15

Abstract: Using the data of the abstracts of asset valuation reports disclosed during 2001 and 2002 by the liated companies of Shanghai Stock Exchange, this paper investigates the relationship between the tummeling motivation of large shareholder and the bias of asset valuation. Our result shows that, when the listed compenies receive the asset to be valuated, the value increase rate of asset valuation is significantly higher in the transaction with large shareholder than it in the transaction with other parties, implying that the tunneling behavior of large shareholder through manipulating the asset valuation is prevalent